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It is beyond dispute that sovereign nations have the right to raise and maintain armies.
This right may come in conflict with the right to conscientious objection, which has
increasingly been recognized as a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. Individuals who face mandatory military service in contravention of their
deep moral convictions, may flee their home countries, and seek refugee status abroad
as a solution. Their recognition as refugees depends on a broad constellation of factors,
including the particular basis for their refusal to serve, the nature of the military conflict
itself, and the degree to which the State in which they seek asylum follows the guidance
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the issue of draft
evasion and desertion as a basis for protection.
This article will examine the trends regarding the protection of the individual
whose claim to refugee status is premised upon a conscientious objection to military
service. It will begin by examining the internationally recognized right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, and discuss its relationship to conscientious objection.
It will then examine the position and underlying rationale of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees on the issue. It will look at the trends in a number of
common law countries, and evaluate the degree to which UNHCR guidance and other
relevant human rights norms are respected. It will conclude by recommending a more
robust protection of individuals of conscience who do not want to participate in the
military.

A conscientious objection to military service is one that is premised on deeplyheld beliefs. It can manifest as pacifism – an objection to fighting in all wars – or
it can be a selective objection to a particular conflict. The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights recently characterized conscientious objection
as an objection to service based on “principles and reasons of conscience, including
profound convictions, arising from religious, moral, ethical, humanitarian or other
motives.”1
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Although the right to conscientious objection is not expressly recognized by
relevant international instruments, many scholars have remarked upon the “recent
and well-established trend in the international community”2 to interpret the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as encompassing the right to
conscientious objection.
The recognition of freedom of religion or belief as a fundamental human right
is well-established in numerous international3 and regional instruments.4 Although
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion had limited recognition
in international law as early as the sixteenth century,5 it was with the establishment
of the United Nations that the right has its origins as an international norm. Art.
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) specifically6 addresses
the right as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.7
The principles articulated in the UDHR were incorporated into Art. 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and in 1981
the U.N. General Assembly adopted by unanimous vote the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief.8
Whether conscientious objection is itself an internationally recognized
right – or simply an emerging human rights norm – has been a matter of some
controversy. In 1985, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which monitors the
ICCPR’s implementation, stated that the Covenant did not provide for the right
to conscientious objection.9 However, in 1993 it reversed its position, stating
that although the “Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious
objection, ...the committee believes that such a right can be derived from article
18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the
freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief.”10
Resolutions issued by the U.N. Human Rights Commission have been in
accord with this evolving recognition. In 1987, the Commission appealed to
States to “recognize that conscientious objection to military service should be
considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.11 In 1995, the Commission once again noted “the right of everyone
to have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exercise of the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion[.]”12 It reiterated this position
once more in 1998.13
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AS A BASIS FOR REFUGEE STATUS
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee Status has addressed
conscientious objection as a basis for refugee status in its Handbook,14 as well as
in it recently released Religion Guidelines.15 In a section of the Handbook entitled
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“Special Cases”, UNHCR sets forth a framework for determining when refugee
status may be premised upon draft evasion or desertion.
The Handbook begins its analysis by stating the widely accepted rule that
punishment for evasion or desertion is not normally considered to be persecution,
and that aversion to military service, or fear of combat are not legitimate reasons
for refusal to serve.16 However, the Handbook carves out two exceptions to the
general rule that it is not persecution to require military service; relevant for our
purposes is the exception which arises when the “performance of military service
would have required ...participation in military action contrary to ...genuine
political, religious, or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.”17
The individual who objects for religious, moral or valid reasons of conscience
must demonstrate the sincerity of his beliefs, the fact that military service is
obligatory, and that the State provides no accommodation for these beliefs.18 A
failure of accommodation could be based upon a showing that State law does not
provide an exemption for conscientious objectors, and that young men only have
the option of serving or being punished for refusal to serve. The individual whose
objections to military service are based on political convictions; i.e., the person
who is “in disagreement with his government regarding the political justification
for a particular military action,” must meet one additional criteria; he must
establish that the type of military action to which he objects “is condemned by the
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.”19
The recommendation of refugee status for those who refuse service for reasons
of conscience was reaffirmed by UNHCR in its Religion Guidelines, which state:
Where military service is compulsory, refugee status may be established if the
refusal to serve is based on genuine political, religious, or moral convictions, or
valid reasons of conscience.... Prosecution and punishment pursuant to a law
of general application is not generally considered to constitute persecution...
In conscientious objector cases, a law purporting to be of general application
may, depending on the circumstances, nonetheless be persecutory where,
for instance....the military service cannot reasonably be expected to be
performed by the individual because of his or her genuine beliefs or religious
convictions.20
Furthermore, this approach has been explicitly adopted by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights. Included in its list of “best practices” in
relation to implementation of the right to conscientious objection, is the policy
that “asylum should be granted to those conscientious objectors compelled to leave
their country of origin because they fear persecution owing to their refusal to
perform military service.”21

71

A SURVEY OF STATE PRACTICES ON REFUGEE STATUS
FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Notwithstanding the strong recommendation of UNHCR and the UNHCHR,
States have erected many jurisprudential barriers to deny refugee protection to
conscientious objectors. As will be discussed below, the U.S. has often employed
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The United States
Religiously-Motivated Claims
In 1992 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the refugee definition’s requirement
that persecution be “on account of ” one of the five Convention grounds required
proof of the persecutor’s motivation. This interpretive approach, which has
been broadly criticized,23 has adversely impacted claims for refugee status based
on conscientious objection – especially religiously-motivated conscientious
objection – because courts have consistently ruled that the government’s intent
was to raise an army, not to persecute the applicant for his or her religion or
belief. The landmark case on this issue is Cañas-Segovia v. INS,24 ruling that it is
not religious persecution to punish Jehovah’s Witnesses25 for refusing to perform
military service.26
However, even with the obstacle to religiously-motivated conscientious
objection cases posed by the intent requirement, there have been some U.S.
decisions recognizing the viability of such claims. These cases generally involve an
element of disproportionate punishment and/or pervasive discrimination against
the religious group in question, and it is these factors that result in a grant of
protection.27
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an overly formalistic nexus analysis to deny protection to religiously-motivated
conscientious objectors. In cases involving American conscientious objectors to
the U.S. war in Iraq, Canada has adopted a troubling approach to determining
whether the military service “is condemned by the international community as
contrary to basic rules of human conduct” as required by the U.N. Handbook in
cases involving objections based on political convictions. There have been some
positive developments in jurisprudence in the U.K., but resistance to recognizing
the right to conscientious objection as an internationally protected right has
resulted in denial of protection. Disappointingly, the recent Qualification
Directive22 which sets forth standards for refugee norms within the European
Union, has taken an overly narrow approach which is inconsistent with more
positive developments within the E.U. on the issue of conscientious objection,
and which will serve to thwart expanded protections. In contrast, New Zealand
has adopted an approach explicitly anchored in international human rights
norms.

Political Conviction Claims
As noted in the discussion of the Handbook’s guidance, objectors whose refusal
to serve is based on political disagreement with the military action must make the
additional showing that the military action be “condemned by the international
community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct[.]” Some cases in the
U.S. have not fared well because of the standard employed to determine whether
or not the military action meets this standard. Several cases have interpreted the
U.N. Handbook as requiring an actual U.N. resolution condemning the military
action.28
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Canada has generally taken a more humanitarian-oriented approach on
conscientious objection cases. It has not followed the “intent” requirement of the
United States, but has adopted a nexus analysis which looks to either the intent or
the effects of the law requiring military service. The principal case setting forth this
approach is Zolfagharkhani v. Canada29 involving an Iranian who did not want to
serve in the military of his country after he learned that the government intended to
use chemical warfare against the Kurds.30 The Court ruled that “the . . . definition
of Convention refugee makes the intent (or any principal effect) of an ordinary law
of general application . . . relevant to the existence of persecution.”31 Canadian
tribunals have consistently applied an interpretation contemplating protection in
cases involving objections to military service based on religion or belief.32
However, recent claims by American servicemen, Jeremy Hinzman and
Brandon David Hughey, who have refused service in Iraq because of their genuine
political convictions have not resulted in protection. The cases, Hinzman v.
Canada33, and Hughey v. Canada34 examined the criteria set forth in Handbook
para. 171; namely that “the type of military action, with which an individual
does not with to be associated, is condemned by the international community as
contrary to basic rules of human conduct[.]” The applicants raised two broad bases
for their claims that they met this criteria, arguing that: (1) the U.S. invasion of
Iraq constituted an illegal war, and on that fact alone they met the standard, and
(2) violations of rules of war were sufficiently pervasive to establish a sufficient
likelihood of being directly implicated in activities contrary to basic rules of
human conduct.
Among the arguments made to support the assertion that the war itself was
illegal, one of the claimants submitted affidavits from international law experts,
who pointed to the lack of a U.N. Security Council approval for the invasion,
and noted that the U.N. Charter only permits the use of force by a country
in cases of self-defense, or with Security Council approval. On the issue of the
pervasiveness of humanitarian law violations, the claimants pointed to reports by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRRC), Human Rights Watch, and
Amnesty International. Mr. Hughey also submitted evidence about the treatment
of prisoners at Guantánamo, Cuba, the practice of torture at Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq, and legal opinions by the U.S. Department of Justice which suggested
that the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment, might not apply to “enemy combatants” held by the United States.
The court denied Hinzman’s claim rejecting both arguments. It ruled that the
illegality of the war could not be called upon as a basis for a “mere foot soldier”35
and that there was no evidence to show that the “breaches of international
humanitarian law that have been committed by American soldiers in Iraq … rise
to the level of being either systematic or condoned by the state.”36 It relied upon
this latter finding to rule that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
the military action in which he could be involved would be “condemned by the
international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct.”
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United Kingdom
In Sepet v. Secretary of State for the Home Department41 the House of Lords
considered a case involving two Kurdish asylum seekers who objected to military
service in Turkey where they believed they would be compelled to fight against
fellow Kurds and engage in acts contrary to international norms. The claim was
analyzed as one premised on “political” objections under U.N. Handbook
para. 171, and was denied on the basis of a failure to show international
condemnation of Turkish military action against the Kurds.
In a subsequent case, Krotov v. Secretary of State for the Home Department42
the federal court moved jurisprudence in a positive direction by shifting the
emphasis away from the requirement of an international condemnation to that
of an evaluation of the military action within a human rights framework. Krotov
involved the claim for refugee status of a citizen of the Russian Federation who
deserted from military service in the Chechen war. In rejecting the requirement of
international condemnation, the court noted that to “hinge the test on international
condemnation would mean having to assess military service cases ... on the basis
of the vagaries of international politics, apt to vary depending on shifting alliances
and whether other countries surveying the conflict take a particular view.”43
The court observed that a “test based directly in international law” would
be more consistent with the “overall framework” of the Refugee Convention,
and noted that to do otherwise would be to “subvert...underlying principles of
interpretation set out by the House of Lords in Horvath.... which seek to base
interpretation of the Refugee Convention on fundamental norms and values drawn
from international law sources, in particular international human rights law….”44
After having ruled that the proper test is not whether the international
community has officially condemned the action, but whether it contravenes
accepted legal standards, the court identified “core humanitarian norms” which
govern such determination, including Common art. 3 to the Geneva Convention
of 1949, and its Additional Protocol II. If acts prohibited by these instruments are
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The court in Hughey also denied the applicant’s claim, but it did leave the
door somewhat open. On the issue of the illegality of a war being relevant in
cases involving foot soldiers, the court cited to its earlier decision, Al-Maisri v.
Canada,37 in ruling that the issue was “not entirely free from doubt”38 and it
certified the question. However, it ruled in concert with the Hinzman court on
the question of the likelihood of involvement with acts contrary to basic rules of
conduct, observing that he had not established that the U.S. engaged in “systematic
violations of humanitarian law.”39
A broader human rights perspective on these cases is provided by a 2005
Amnesty International briefing on the case of Jeremy Hinzman. After stating
its position that the right to refuse military service for reasons of conscience is
“inherent in the notion of freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” and
expressing its assessment of Mr. Hinzman as a genuine conscientious objector, AI
concludes that if he were to be forcibly returned to the U.S. and imprisoned, it
would “adopt him as a prisoner of conscience.”40
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“committed on a systemic basis as an aspect of deliberate policy, or as a result of
official indifference to the widespread actions of a brutal military” the individual
who has a well-founded fear of punishment for refusal to participate will come
within the refugee definition.

New Zealand

The European Union
One scholar, Cecilia Bailliet, has noted that developments regarding conscientious
objection within the European Union display a type of “schizophrenia.”53 Bailliet
refers to encouragement of members by the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly “to adopt national legislation recognizing the right of conscientious
objection as derived from fundamental rights of the individual[.]”54 However,
at the same time, the Council of the European Union adopted a Qualification
Directive which provides for refugee status for draft resisters or evaders which is far
more limited than that recommended by the UNHCR.
The Qualification Directive, at Art. 9(1) defines persecution; prosecution or
punishment for refusal to perform military service only constitutes persecution
“where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under
the exclusion clauses[.]”55 Whereas the UNHCR recommends refugee status
whenever the military service is contrary to “genuine political, religious or moral
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In the past, New Zealand took an approach similar to that of the U.S. It cited
the fact that military service is imposed by way of a law of universal application
to rule that neither the service itself nor punishment for refusal was linked to
a Convention reason.45 On this basis it denied claims of a Russian citizen with
religious and moral objections to serving in Chechnya;46 a national of Ukraine and
the Russian Federation with religious objections to serving in Chechyna;47 and two
separate cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses from South Korea.48
Subsequently the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) modified its
position, concluding that an intent to persecute was not required; what was
required was only a showing that the “Convention-protected ground was a
‘contributing cause’ to the risk of being persecuted.49 In addition to the shift away
from requirement of proof of intent, the RSAA “reaffirmed its preference for
determining refugee status issues via what has become known as the ‘human rights
approach[.]’”50
The RSAA employed this approach to rule in favor of a Kurdish conscientious
objector from Turkey. In deciding the case, the RSAA referred to the “proposition
that no one can be compelled to undertake military service where a real chance
exists that this will require the refugee claimant to commit human rights abuses.”51
It reached the conclusion that such a risk existed in light of “the history of the
conflict, attendant breaches of the laws of war on a widespread scale in the past
and a continuing climate of impunity for those who commit the breaches[.]”52 The
likelihood of being compelled to commit humanitarian law violations transformed
his potential imprisonment for resisting service into persecution for a Convention
reason.
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CONCLUSION
One of the most fundamental moral choices an individual can make is whether
to kill another human being. Service in the military confronts the individual with
this possibility, and raises profound questions of conscience. It is encouraging that
there is a greater recognition that conscientious objection is a legitimate exercise
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. However, the refugee
practice of many countries continue to interpret the law in a way which denies
protection to genuine conscientious objectors. State practice should better reflect
the guidance and recommendations of UNHCR, and avoid overly formalistic
analyses which result in the limiting protection to young men who do not wish
to bear arms.
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